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1. Introduction 
I have seen something else under the sun: 
The race is not to the swift 
   or the battle to the strong, 
nor does food come to the wise 
   or wealth to the brilliant 
or favour to the learned; 
but time and chance happens to them all. 
 
King Salomon 
Ecclesiastes 9:11 
 
Time and chance happens to them all… – a statement fitting one corporate scandal after the 
other, culminating by a financial crisis that has demonstrated that major risks were ignored 
or not even identified and managed, see for example (The Economist 2002, 2009). Before 
these scandals, risk management was an increasingly hot topic on a wider scale in 
corporations. For example, the Turnbull Report made at the request of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) ‘… is about the adoption of a risk-based approach to establishing a system 
of internal control and reviewing its effectiveness’ (Jones and Sutherland 1999), and it is a 
mandatory requirement for all companies at the LSE. Yet, its effectiveness might be 
questioned as the financial crisis shows.  
Furthermore, we must acknowledge the paradox that the increasing reliance on risk 
management have in fact lead decision-makers to take risks they normally would not take, 
see (Bernstein 1996). This has also been clearly demonstrated by one financial institution 
after the other in the run-up to the financial crisis. Sophisticated risk management and 
financial instruments lead people astray, see for example (The Economist 2009). Thus, risk 
management can be a double-edged sword as we either run the risk of ignoring risks (and 
risk management), or we fall victim to potential deception by risk management.  
Nonetheless, there exists numerous risk management approaches, but all suffer from a 
major limitation:  They cannot produce consistent decision support to the extent desired and 
subsequently they become less trustworthy. As an example; three independent consulting 
companies performed a risk analysis of a hydro-electric power plant and reached widely 
different conclusions, see (Backlund and Hannu 2002).  
                                                 
Note that the views presented in this chapter are those solely of the author and do not represent the 
company or any of its stakeholders in any fashion. 
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This chapter therefore focuses on reducing these limitations and improve the quality of risk 
management. However, it is unlikely that any approach can be developed that is 100% 
consistent, free of deception and without the risk of reaching different conclusions. There 
will always be an element of art, albeit less than today.  
The element of art is inescapable partly due to a psychological phenomenon called framing 
which is a bias we humans have ingrained in us to various degrees, see (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Their findings have later been confirmed in industry, see for example (Pieters 
2004). Another issue is the fact that often we are in situations where we either lack 
numerical data, or the situation is too complex to allow the usage of numerical data at all. 
This forces us to apply subjective reasoning in the process concerning probability- and 
impact estimates regardless whether the estimates themselves are based on nominal-, 
ordinal-, interval- or ratio scales. For more on these scales, see (Stevens 1946).  
We might be tempted to believe that the usage of numerical data and statistics would 
greatly reduce the subjective nature of risk management, but research is less conclusive. It 
seems that it has merely altered it. The subjective nature on the individual level is reduced 
as each case is based on rational or bounded rational analysis, but on an industry level it has 
become more systemic for a number of reasons: 
1. Something called herding is very real in the financial industries (Hwang and Salmon 
2004), which use statistical risk management methods. Herding can be defined as a 
situation when ‘…a group of investors following each other into (or out of) the same 
securities over some period of time [original italics]”, see (Sias 2004). More generally, 
herding can be defined as ‘…behaviour patterns that are correlated across individuals”, 
see (Devenow and Welch 1996). 
2. Investors have a tendency to overreact (De Bondt and Thaler 1985), which is human, 
but not rational.  
3. Lack of critical thinking in economic analyses is a very common problem particularly 
when statistical analyses are involved – it is a kind of intellectual herding. For example, 
two economists, Deirdre McCloskey and Stephen Ziliak studied to what degree papers 
in the highly respected journal American Economic Review failed to separate statistical 
significance from plausible explanations of economic reality, see (The Economist 2004). 
Their findings are depressing: first, in the 1980s 70 % of the papers failed to distinguish 
between economic - and statistical significance, and second, in the 1990s more than 80 % 
failed. This is particularly a finding that researchers must address because the number 
among practitioners is probably even worse, and if researchers (and teachers) cannot do 
it correctly we can hardly expect practitioners to show the way.  
Clearly, subjectivity is a problem for risk management in one way or the other as discussed. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to show how augmenting the risk management 
process will reduce the degree of subjectivity to a minimum and thereby improve the 
quality of the decision support.  
Next, some basic concepts – risk and uncertainty – are introduced. Without useful 
definitions of risk and uncertainty, an enlightening discussion is impossible. Then, in 
Section 3, a common – almost ‘universal’ – risk management approach is presented. Then, in 
Section 4, an improved approach – the augmented risk management approach – is 
presented. Critical evaluation of the approach and future ideas are discussed in Section 5. A 
closure is provided in Section 6. A simple, functional case is provided along for illustrational 
purposes.  
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2. Introducing risk and uncertainty 
Risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably. For example, (Friedlob and Schleifer 
1999) claim that for auditors ‘risk is uncertainty’. It may be that distinguishing between risk 
and uncertainty makes little sense for auditors, but the fact is that there are many basic 
differences as explained next. First, risk is discussed from traditional perspectives, and the 
sources of risks are investigated. Second, the concept of uncertainty is explored. Finally, a 
more technical discussion about probability and possibility is conducted to try to settle an 
old score in some of the literature.  
2.1 Risk 
The word ‘risk’ derives from the early Italian word risicare, which originally means ‘to dare’. 
In this sense risk is a choice rather than a fate (Bernstein 1996).  Other definitions also imply 
a choice aspect. Risk as a general noun is defined as ‘exposure to the chance of injury or loss; 
a hazard or dangerous chance’ (Webster 1989). Along the same token, in statistical decision 
theory risk is defined as ‘the expected value of a loss function’ (Hines and Montgomery 
1990). Thus, various definitions of risk imply that we expose ourselves to risk by choice. 
Risk is measured, however, in terms of ‘consequences and likelihood’ (Robbins and Smith 
2001; Standards Australia 1999) where likelihood is understood as a ‘qualitative description 
of probability or frequency’, but frequency theory is dependent on probability theory 
(Honderich 1995). Thus, risk is ultimately a probabilistic phenomenon as it is defined in 
most literature.  
It is important to emphasize that ‘risk is not just bad things happening, but also good things 
not happening’ (Jones and Sutherland 1999) – a clarification that is particularly crucial in 
risk analysis of social systems. Many companies do not fail from primarily taking ‘wrong 
actions’, but from not capitalizing on their opportunities, i.e., the loss of an opportunity. As 
(Drucker 1986) observes, ‘The effective business focuses on opportunities rather than 
problems’. Risk management is ultimately about being proactive.  
It should also be emphasized that risk is perceived differently in relation to gender, age and 
culture. On an average, women are more risk averse than men, and more experienced 
managers are more risk averse than younger ones (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986). 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that successful managers take more risk than unsuccessful 
managers. Perhaps there are ties between the young managers’ ‘contemporary competence’ 
and his exposure to risks and success?  At any rate, our ability to identify risks is limited by 
our perceptions of risks. This is important to be aware of when identifying risks – many 
examples of sources of risks are found in (Government Asset Management Committee 2001) 
and (Jones and Sutherland 1999).  
According to a 1999 Deloitte & Touche survey the potential failure of strategy is one of the 
greatest risks in the corporate world. Another is the failure to innovate. Unfortunately, such 
formulations have limited usefulness in managing risks as explained later – is ‘failure of 
strategy’ a risk or a consequence of a risk?  To provide an answer we must first look into the 
concept of uncertainty since ‘the source of risk is uncertainty’ (Peters 1999). This derives 
from the fact that risk is a choice rather than a fate and occurs whenever there are one-to-
many relations between a decision and possible future outcomes, see Figure 1.  
Finally, it should be emphasized that it is important to distinguish between the concept of 
probability, measures of probability and probability theory, see (Emblemsvåg 2003). There is 
much dispute about the subject matter of probability (see (Honderich 1995)). Here, the idea 
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that probability is a ‘degree of belief’ is subscribed to, but that it can be measured in several 
ways out of which the classical probability calculus of Pascal and others is the best known. 
For simplicity and generality the definition of risk found in (Webster 1989) is used here – the 
‘exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance’. Furthermore, 
‘degree of impact and degree of belief’ is used to measure risk.  
One basic tenet of this chapter is that there are situations where classic probability calculus 
may prove deceptive in risk analyses. This is not to say, however, that probability theory 
should be discarded altogether – we simply believe that probability theory and other 
theories can complement each other if we understand when to use what. Concerning risk 
analysis, it is argued that other theories provide a better point of departure than the classic 
probability theory, but first the concept of uncertainty is explored, which is done next.  
2.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty as a general noun is defined as ‘the state of being uncertain; doubt; hesitancy’ 
(Webster 1989). Thus, there is neither loss nor gain necessarily associated with uncertainty; it 
is simply the not known with certainty – not the unknown.  
Some define uncertainty as ‘the inability to assign probability to outcomes’, and risk is 
regarded as the ‘ability to assign such probabilities based on differing perceptions of the 
existence of orderly relationships or patterns’ (Gilford, Bobbitt et al. 1979). Such definitions 
are too simplistic for our purpose because in most situations the relationships or patterns are 
not orderly; they are complex. Also, the concepts of gain and loss, choice and fate and more 
are missed using such simplistic definitions.  
Consequently, uncertainty and complexity are intertwined and as an unpleasant side effect, 
imprecision emerges. Lotfi A. Zadeh formulated this fact in a theorem called the Law of 
Incompatibility (McNeill and Freiberger 1993): 
 
As complexity rises, precise statements lose meaning 
and meaningful statements lose precision. 
 
Since all organizations experience some degree of complexity, this theorem is crucial to 
understand and act in accordance with. With complexity we refer to the state in which the 
cause-and-effect relationships are loose, for example, operating a sailboat. A mechanical 
clock, however, in which the relationship between the parts is precisely defined, is 
complicated – not complex. From the Law of Incompatibility we understand that there are 
limits to how precise decision support both can and should be (to avoid deception), due to 
the inherent uncertainty caused by complexity. Therefore, by increasing the uncertainty in 
analyses and other decision support material to better reflect the true and inherent 
uncertainty we will actually lower the actual risk.  
In fact, Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow warns us that ‘[O]ur knowledge of the way things 
work, in society or in Nature, comes trailing clouds of vagueness. Vast ills have followed a 
belief in certainty’ (Arrow 1992). Basically, ignoring complexity and/or uncertainty is risky, 
and accuracy may be deceptive. The NRC Governing Board on the Assessment of Risk 
shares a similar view, see (Zimmer 1986). Thus, striking a sound balance between 
meaningfulness and precision is crucial, and possessing a relatively clear understanding of 
uncertainty is needed since uncertainty and complexity are so closely related.  
Note that there are two main types of uncertainty, see Figure 1, fuzziness and ambiguity. 
Definitions in the literature differ slightly but are more or less consistent with Figure 1. 
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Fuzziness occurs whenever definite, sharp, clear or crisp distinctions are not made. 
Ambiguity results from unclear definitions of the various alternatives (outcomes). These 
alternatives can either be in conflict with each other or they can be unspecified. The former 
is ambiguity resulting from discord whereas the latter is ambiguity resulting from 
nonspecificity. The ambiguity resulting from discord is essentially what (classic) probability 
theory focuses on, because ‘probability theory can model only situations where there are 
conflicting beliefs about mutually exclusive alternatives’ (Klir 1991). In fact, neither 
fuzziness nor nonspecificity can be conceptualized by probability theories that are based on 
the idea of ‘equipossibility’ because such theories are ‘digital’ in the sense that degrees of 
occurrence is not allowed – it either occurs or not. Put differently, uncertainty is too wide of 
a concept for classical probability theory, because it is closely linked to equipossibility 
theory, see (Honderich 1995).  
Kangari and Riggs (1989) have discussed the various methods used in risk analysis and 
classified them as either ‘classical’ (probability based) or ‘conceptual’ (fuzzy set based). 
Their findings are similar: 
 
… probability models suffer from two major limitations. Some models require 
detailed quantitative information, which is not normally available at the time of 
planning, and the applicability of such models to real project risk analysis is 
limited, because agencies participating in the project have a problem with making 
precise decisions. The problems are ill-defined and vague, and they thus require 
subjective evaluations, which classical models cannot handle.  
 
To deal with both fuzziness and nonspecific ambiguity, however, Zadeh invented fuzzy sets 
– ‘the first new method of dealing with uncertainty since the development of probability’ 
(Zadeh 1965) – and the associated possibility theory. Fuzzy sets and possibility theory 
handle the widest scope of uncertainty and so must risk analyses. Thus, these theories seem 
to offer a sound point of departure for an augmented risk management process.  
 
Uncertainty
FUZZINESS
The lack of definite or
sharp distinctions
 vagueness
 cloudiness
 haziness
 unclearness
 indistinctness
 sharplessness
AMBIGUITY
One-to-many relationships
NONSPECIFICITY
Two or more alternatives
are left unspecified
 variety
 generality
 diversity
 equivocation
 imprecision
DISCORD
Disagreement in choosing
among several alternatives
 dissonance
 incongruity
 haziness
 discrepancy
 conflict
 
Fig. 1. The basic types of uncertainty (Klir and Yuan 1995) 
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For the purpose of this chapter, however, the discussion revolves around how probability 
can be estimated, and not the calculus that follows. In this context possibility theory offers 
some important ideas explained in Section 2.3. Similar ideas seem also to have been 
absorbed by a type of probability theory denoted ‘subjective probability theory’, see e.g. 
(Roos 1998). In fact, here, we need not distinguish between possibility theory and subjective 
probability theory because the main difference between those theories lies in the calculus, 
but the difference in calculus is of no interest to us. This is due to the fact that we only use 
the probability estimates to rank the risks and do not perform any calculus.  
In the remainder of this chapter the term ‘classic probability theory’ is used to separate it 
from subjective probability theory.  
2.3 Probability theory versus possibility theory 
The crux of the difference between classic probability theory and possibility theory lies in 
the estimation technique. For example, consider the Venn diagram in Figure 2. The two 
outcomes A and B in outcome space S overlap, i.e., they are not mutually exclusive. The 
probability of A is in other words dependent on the probability of B, and vice versa. This 
situation is denoted nonspecific ambiguity in Figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Two non-mutually exclusive outcomes in outcome space S 
In classic probability theory we look at A in relation to S and correct for overlaps so that the 
sum of all outcomes will be 100% (all exhaustible). In theory this is straightforward, but in 
practice calculating the probability of A * B is problematic in cases where A and B are 
interdependent and the underlying cause-and-effect relations are complex. Thus, in such 
cases we find that the larger the probability of A * B, the larger may the mistake of using 
classic probability theory become.  
In possibility theory, however, we simply look at the outcomes in relation to each other, and 
consequently S becomes irrelevant and overlaps do not matter. The possibility of A will 
simply be A to A + B in Figure 2. Clearly, possibility theory is intuitive and easy, but we pay 
a price - loss of precision (an outcome in comparison to outcome space) both in definition (as 
discussed here) and in its further calculus operations (not discussed here). This loss of 
precision is, however, more true to high levels of complexity and that is often crucial 
because ‘firms are mutually dependent’ (Porter 1998). Also, it is important that risk 
management approaches do not appear more reliable than they are because then decision-
makers can be lead to accept decisions they normally would reject, as discussed earlier.  
This discussion clearly illustrates that ‘[classic] probabilistic approaches are based on 
counting whereas possibilistic logic is based on relative comparison’ (Dubois, Lang et al.). 
There are also other differences between classic probability theory and possibility theory, 
which is not discussed here. It should be noted that several places in the literature the word 
S
A B
A  B
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‘probability’ is used in cases that are clearly possibilistic. This is probably more due to the 
fact that ‘probability’ is a common word – which has double meaning (Bernstein 1996) – 
than reflecting an actual usage of classic probability theory and calculus.  
One additional difference that is pertinent here is the difference between ‘event’ and 
‘sensation’. The term ‘event’ applied in probability theory requires a certain level of 
distinctiveness in defining what is occurring and what is not. ‘The term ‘sensation’ has 
therefore been proposed in possibility theory, and it is something weaker than an event’ 
(Kaufmann 1983). The idea behind ‘sensation’ is important in corporate settings because the 
degree of distinctness that the definition of ‘event’ requires is not always obtainable.  
Also, the term ‘possibility’ is preferred here over ‘probability’ to emphasize that positive 
risks – opportunities, or possibilities – should be pursued actively. Furthermore, using a 
possibilistic foundation (based on relative ordering as opposed to the absolute counting in 
classic probability theory), provides added decision support because ‘one needs to present 
comparison scenarios that are located on the probability scale to evoke people’s own feeling 
of risk’ (Kunreuther, Meyer et al. 2004).  
To summarize so far: the (Webster 1989) definition of risk is used – the ‘exposure to the 
chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance’ – while risk is measured in terms of 
‘degree of impact’ and ‘degree of belief’. Furthermore, the word ‘possibility’ is used to 
denote estimate the degree of belief of a specific sensation. Alternatively, probability 
theoretical terms can be employed under the explicit understanding that the terms are not 
100% correct – this may be a suitable approach in many cases when practitioners are 
involved because fine-tuned terms can be too difficult to understand.  
Next, a more or less standard risk management process is reviewed.  
3. Brief review of risk management approaches 
All risk management approaches known to the author are variations of the framework 
presented in Figure 3. They may differ in wording, number of steps and content of steps, but 
the basic principles remain the same, see (Meyers 2006) for more examples and details. The 
discussion here is therefore related to the risk management process shown in Figure 3. The 
depicted risk management process can be found in several versions in the literature, see for 
example public sources such as (CCMD Roundtable on Risk Management 2001; 
Government Asset Management Committee 2001; Jones and Sutherland 1999) and it is 
employed by risk management specialists such as the maritime classing society Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV)1. The fact that the adherence to the same standards leads to different 
implementations is also discussed by (Meyers 2006).  
Briefly stated, the process proceeds as follows: In the initial step, all up-front issues are 
identified and clarified. Proposal refers to anything for which decision support is needed; a 
project proposal, a proposal for a new strategy and so on. The objectives are important to 
clarify because risks arise in pursuit of objectives as discussed earlier. The criteria are 
essentially definitions of what is ‘good enough’. The purpose of defining the key elements is 
to provide relevant categorization to ease the risk analysis. Since all categorization is 
deceptive to some degree, see (Emblemsvåg and Bras 2000), it is important to avoid 
unnecessary categories. The categories should therefore be case specific and not generic.  
                                                 
1 Personal experience as consultant in Det Norske Veritas (DNV). 
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Fig. 3. Traditional risk management process. Based on (Government Asset Management 
Committee 2001) 
The second step is the analysis of risks by identification, assessment, ranking and screening 
out minor risks. This step is filled with shortcomings and potential pitfalls of the serious 
kind. This step relies heavily on subjectivism, and that is a challenge in itself because it can 
produce widely different results as (Backlund and Hannu 2002) point out. The challenge 
was that there existed no consistent decision support for improving the model other than to 
revise the input – sadly sometimes done to obtain preconceived results. For example, 
suppose we identified three risks – A, B and C – and want to assess their probabilities and 
impacts, see Figure 4. The assessment is usually performed by assigning numbers that 
describe probability and impact, but the logic behind the assignment is unclear at best, and 
it is impossible to perform any sort of analysis to further improve this assignment. 
Typically, the discussion ends up by placing the risks in a matrix like the ones shown in 
Figure 4, but without any consistency checks it is difficult to argue which one, if any, of the 
two matrices in Figure 4 fit reality the best. Thus, the recommendations can become quite 
different, and herein lays one of the most problematic issues of this process. In the 
augmented risk management process this problem is overcome, as we shall see later. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The arbitrary assignment of probability and impact in a risk ranking matrix 
The third step – response planning, or risk management strategies – depends directly on the 
risk analysis. If the assignment is as arbitrary as the study of (Backlund and Hannu 2002) 
shows, then the suggested responses will vary greatly. Thus, a more reliable way of 
analysing risks must be found, which is discussed in Section 4. Nonetheless, there are four 
generic risk management strategies; 1) risk prevention (reduce probability), 2) impact 
mitigation (reduce impact), 3) transfer (risk to a third party such as an insurance company) 
or simply 4) accept (the risk). Depending on the chosen risk management strategy, specific 
action plans are developed.  
The fourth step is often an integral part of step three, but in some projects it may be 
beneficial to formalize reporting into a separate step, see (Government Asset Management 
Committee 2001) for more information.  
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The fifth step – implementation (of the action schedules, management measures and 
allocation of management resources and responsibilities) is obviously an important step in 
risk management. It is vital that the effectiveness of these measures must be monitored and 
checked to secure effective implementation. Possible new risks must also be identified, and 
so the risk management process starts all over again. Just like the famous PDCA circle, the 
risk management process never stops.  
In addition to the obvious problems with the risk analysis as argued earlier, the entire risk 
management process lacks three important aspects that aggravate the problems: 
1. The capabilities of the organization – the strengths and weaknesses – are either ignored 
or treated as implicit at best. This is a problem in itself because we cannot rely on 
responses that cannot be implemented. Understanding that risks are relative to the 
organization’s capabilities is a leap for risk analysis in direction of strategic analysis, 
which has often incorporated this factor. In other words, risk management should be 
regarded just as much as management of capabilities as management of risks. If an 
analysis shall provide recommendations for actions, it is clear that the capabilities, 
which can be managed, are needed in the risk analysis as well. In this chapter using risk 
management in strategy is not discussed, so interested readers on how this can be done 
are referred to (Emblemsvåg and Kjølstad 2002).  
2. There is no management of information quality. Management of information quality is 
crucial in risk management because uncertainty is prevalent. Uncertainty can be 
defined as a state for which we lack information, see (Emblemsvåg and Kjølstad 2002). 
Thus, uncertainty analysis should play an integral part in risk management to ensure 
that the uncertainty in the risk management process is kept at an economically feasible 
level. The same argument also holds for the usage of sensitivity analyses; both on risk- 
and uncertainty analyses. This idea is also supported by (Backlund and Hannu 2002).  
3. There is no explicit management of either existing knowledge that can be applied to 
improve the quality of the analyses, or to improve the knowledge acquired in the 
process at hand which can be used in the follow-up process. The augmented risk 
management approach therefore incorporates Knowledge Management (KM). KM is 
believed to be pivotal to ensure an effective risk management process by providing 
context and learning possibilities. In essence, risk management is not just about 
managing risks – the entire context surrounding the risks must be understood and 
managed effectively. Neef (2005) states that ‘Risk management is knowledge 
management’, but the point is that the reverse is also important.  
This is where the greatest methodological challenge for the augmented risk management 
process lies – how to manage knowledge. According to (Wickramasinghe 2003), knowledge 
management in its broadest sense refers to how a firm acquires, stores and applies its own 
intellectual capital, and according to (Takeuchi 1998), Nonaka insisted that knowledge 
cannot be ‘managed’ but ‘led'. Worse, we are still not sure what knowledge management 
really involves (Asllani and Luthans 2003). These aspects, along with the augmented risk 
management process are elaborated upon in the next section.  
4. The augmented risk management process 
The augmented risk management process is presented in Figure 5, and it is organized into 
five steps as indicated by a number, title and colour band (greyish or white). Furthermore, 
each step consists of three parallel processes; 1) the actual risk management process, 2) the 
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information management process to improve the model quality and 3) the KM process to 
improve the usefulness of the model. These steps and processes are explained next, section 
by section. At the end of each section a running, real-life case is provided for illustrational 
purposes.  
 
 
Fig. 5. The augmented risk management process 
4.1 Step 1 – provide context 
A decision triggers the entire process (note that to not make a conscious decision is also a 
decision). The context can be derived from the decision itself and the analyses performed 
prior to the decision, which are omitted in Figure 5. The context includes the objectives, the 
criteria, measurements for determining the degree of success or failure, and the necessary 
resources. Identifying relevant knowledge about the situation is also important. The 
knowledge is either directly available or it is tacit2, and the various types of knowledge may 
interplay as suggested by the SECI model3, see (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Tacit 
knowledge can be either implicit or really tacit (Li and Gao 2003), and it is often the most 
valuable because it is a foundation for building sustainable competitive advantage, but it is 
unfortunately less available, see (Cavusgil, Calantone et al. 2003). Residing in the mind of 
employees, as much tacit knowledge as possible should be transferred to the organization 
                                                 
2 The dichotomy of tacit- and explicit knowledge is attributable to (Polanyi, M. 1966), who found that 
tacit knowledge is a kind of knowledge that cannot be readily articulated because it is elusive and 
subjective. Explicit knowledge, however, is the written word, the articulated and the like.  
3 SECI (Socialization, Externalization, Combination, and Internalization) represents the four phases of 
the conversions between explicit and tacit knowledge. Often, the starting points of conversion cycles 
start from the phase of socialization (Li, M. and F. Gao (2003). 
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and hence become explicit knowledge, as explained later. How this can be done in reality is 
a major field of research. In fact, (Earl 2001) provides a comprehensive review of KM and 
proposes seven schools of knowledge management. As noted earlier, even reputed scholars 
of the field question the management of knowledge…   
Therefore, this chapter simply tries to map out some steps in the KM process that is required 
without claiming that this is the solution. The point here is merely that we must have a 
conscious relationship towards certain basic steps such as identifying what we know, 
evaluate what takes place, learn from it and then increase the pool of what we know. How 
this (and possibly more steps) should be done most effectively, is a matter for future work. 
Currently, we do not have a tested solution for the KM challenge, but a potentially workable 
idea is presented in Section 5.  
From the objectives, resources, criteria and our knowledge we can determine what 
information is needed and map what information and data is available. Lack of information 
at this stage, which is common, will introduce uncertainty into the entire process. By 
identifying lacking information and data we can already early in the process determine if 
we should pursue better information and data. However, we lack knowledge about what 
information and data would be most valuable to obtain, which is unknown until Step 3.  
Compared to traditional risk management approaches the most noticeable difference in this 
step is that explicit relations between context and knowledge are established to identify the 
information and knowledge needs. Typical procedures- and systems of knowledge that can 
be used include (Neef 2005): 
1. Knowledge mapping – a process by which an organization determines ‘who knows 
what’ in the company. 
2. Communities of practice – naturally-forming networks of employees with similar 
interests or experience, or with complementary skills, who would normally gather to 
discuss common issues. 
3. Hard-tagging experts – a knowledge management process that combines knowledge 
mapping with a formal mentoring process. 
4. Learning – a post-incident assessment process where lessons learned are digested.  
5. Encouraging a knowledge-sharing culture – values and expectations for ethical 
behaviour are communicated widely and effectively throughout the organization. 
6. Performance monitoring and reporting – what you measure is what you get.  
7. Community and stakeholder involvement – help company leaders sense and respond to 
early concerns from these outside parties (government, unions, non-governmental or 
activist groups, the press, etc.), on policy matters that could later develop into serious 
conflicts or incidents. 
8. Business research and analysis – search for, organize and distribute information from 
internal and external sources concerning local political, cultural, and legal concerns. 
Running case 
The decision-maker is a group of investors that wants to find out if it is worth investing 
more into a new-to-the-world transportation concept in South Korea. They are also 
concerned about how to attract new investors. A company has been incorporated to bring 
the new technology to the market. The purpose of the risk management process is to map 
out potential risks and capabilities and identify how they should be handled. The direct 
objectives of the investors related to this process are to; 1) identify if the new concept is 
viable, and if it is to 2) identify how to convince other investors to join.  
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The investors are experienced people working in mass transit for years, so some knowledge 
about the market was available. Since the case involves a new-to-the world mass transit 
solution, there is little technical- and business process knowledge to draw from other than 
generic business case methods from the literature.  
4.2 Step 2 – Identify risks and capabilities 
Once a proper context is established, the next step is to identify the risks and the capabilities 
of the organization. Here, the usage of the SWOT framework is very useful, see 
(Emblemsvåg and Kjølstad 2002), substituting risks for threats and opportunities, and 
organizational capabilities for strengths and weaknesses. Identifying the capabilities is to 
determine what risk management strategies can be successfully deployed.  
This step is similar to the equivalent step in traditional approaches, but some differences 
exist. First, risks are explicitly separated from uncertainties. Risks arise due to decisions 
made, while uncertainty is due to lacking information, see (Emblemsvåg and Kjølstad 2002). 
Risks lurk in uncertainty as it were, but uncertainties are not necessarily associated with loss 
and hence are not interchangeable with risks. Separating uncertainties from risks may seem 
of academic interest, but uncertainty has to do with information management and hence 
improvement of model quality, see Figure 5, while risks is the very objective of the model. 
The findings of (Backlund and Hannu 2002) also support this ascertainment.  
Second, the distinction between capabilities and risks is important because capabilities are 
the means to the end (managing risks in pursuit of objectives). Often, risks, uncertainties 
and capabilities are mingled which inhibits effective risk management.  
Third, for any management tool to be useful it must be anchored in real world experiences 
and knowledge. Neither the risk management process nor the information management 
process can provide such anchoring. Consequently, it is proposed to link both the risk 
management and information management processes to a KM process so that knowledge 
can be effectively applied in the steps. Otherwise we run the risk of, for example, only 
identifying obvious risks and falling prey to local ‘myths’, stereotypes and the like. For more 
information on how to do this, consult the ‘continuous improvement’ philosophy and 
approaches of Deming as described in (Latzco and Saunders 1995) and double loop learning 
processes as presented by (Argyris 1977, 1978).  
Running case 
The viability of the concept was related to 5 risk categories; 1) finance, 2) technology, 3) 
organizational (internal), 4) market and 5) communication. The latter is important in this 
case because an objective is to attract investors.  
We started by reviewing all available documentation about the technology, business plans, 
marketing plans and whatever we thought were relevant after the objectives had been 
clarified. We identified more than 200 risks. Then, we spent about a week with top 
management, in which we also interviewed the director of a relevant governmental research 
institute and other parties, for a review of the technology and various communication and 
marketing related risks.  
Based on this information we performed a SWOT after which 39 risks remained significant. 
The vast reduction in the number of risks occurs, as the documentation did not contain all 
that was relevant. In due course, this fact was established as a specific communication risk. 
To reduce the number of risks even further we performed a traditional screening of the 39 
risks down to 24 and then proceeded to Step 3. This screening totally eliminated the 
organizational (internal) risks, so we ended up with 4 risk categories.  
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4.3 Step 3 – perform analyses 
As indicated in Figure 5, we propose to have four types of analyses that are integrated in the 
same model; 1) a risk analysis, 2) a sensitivity analysis of the risk analysis, 3) an uncertainty 
analysis and 4) a sensitivity analysis of the uncertainty analysis. The purpose of these 
analyses is not just to analyse risks but to also provide a basis for double-loop learning, that 
is, learning with feedback both with respect to information and knowledge. Most 
approaches lack this learning capability and hence lack any systematic way of improving 
themselves. The critical characteristic missing is consistency.  
All these four analyses can be conducted in one single model if the model is built around a 
structure similar to Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). The reason for this is that AHP is 
built using mathematics, and a great virtue of mathematics is its consistency – a trait no 
other system of thought can match. Despite the inherent translation uncertainty between 
qualitative and quantitative measures, the only way to ensure consistent subjective risk 
analyses is to translate the subjective measures into numbers and then perform some sort of 
consistency check. The only approach that can handle qualitative issues with controlled 
consistency is AHP and variations thereof.  
Thomas Lorie Saaty developed AHP in the late 1960s to primarily provide decision support 
for multi-objective selection problems. Since then, (Saaty and Forsman 1992) have utilized 
AHP in a wide array of situations including resource allocation, scheduling, project 
evaluation, military strategy, forecasting, conflict resolution, political strategy, safety, 
financial risk and strategic planning. Others have also used AHP in a variety of situations 
such as supplier selection (Bhutta and Huq 2002), determining measures of business 
performance (Cheng and Li 2001), and in quantitative construction risk management of a 
cross-country petroleum pipeline project in India (Dey 2001).  
The greatest advantage of the AHP concept, for our purpose, is that it incorporates a logic 
consistency check of the answers provided by the various participants in the process. As 
(Cheng and Li 2001) claim; ‘it [AHP] is able to prevent respondents from responding 
arbitrarily, incorrectly, or non-professionally’. The arbitrariness of Figure 4 will 
consequently rarely occur. Furthermore, the underlying mathematical structure of AHP 
makes sensitivity analyses both with respect to the risk- and the uncertainty analysis 
meaningful, which in turn guides learning efforts. This is impossible in traditional 
frameworks. How Monte Carlo methods can be employed is shown in (Emblemsvåg and 
Tonning 2003). The theoretical background for this is explained thoroughly in (Emblemsvåg 
2003), to which the interested reader is referred.  
The relative rankings generated by the AHP matrix system can be used as so called 
subjective probabilities or possibilities as well as relative impacts or even relative 
capabilities. The estimates will be relative, but that is sufficient since the objective of a risk 
analysis is to effectively direct attention towards the critical risks so that they will be 
attended to. However, by including a known absolute reference in the AHP matrices we can 
provide absolute ranking if desired.  
The first step in applying the AHP matrix system is to first identify the risks we want to 
rank, which is done in step 2. Second, due to the hierarchical nature of AHP we must 
organize the items as a hierarchy. For example, all risks are divided into commercial risks, 
technological risks, financial risks, operational risks and so on. These risk categories is then 
broken down into detailed risks. For example, financial risks may consist of cash flow 
exposure risks, currency risks, interest risks and so forth. It is important that the number of 
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children below a parent in a hierarchy is not more than 9, because human cognition has 
great problems handling more than 9 issues at the same time, see (Miller 1956). In our 
experience, it is wise to limit oneself to 7 or less children per parent simply because being 
consistent across more than 7 items in a comparison is very difficult. Third, we must 
perform the actual pair-wise comparison.  
To operationalize pair-wise comparisons, we used the ordinal scales and the average 
Random Index (RI) values provided in Tables 1 and 2 – note that this will per default 
produce 1 on the diagonals. According to (Peniwati 2000), the RIs are defined to allow a 10% 
inconsistency in the answers. Note that the values in Table 1 must be interpreted in its 
specific context. Thus, when we speak of probability of scale 1 it should linguistically be 
interpreted as ‘equally probable’. This may seem unfamiliar to most, but it is easier to see 
how this work by using the running example. First, however, a quick note on the KM side of 
this step should be mentioned.  
 
Intensity of 
Importance (1) 
Definition (2) Explanation (3) 
1 Equal importance Two items contribute equally to the objective 
3 Moderate 
importance 
Experience and judgment slightly favor one 
over another 
5 Strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favor one 
over another 
7 Very strong 
importance 
An activity is strongly favored and its 
dominance is demonstrated in practice 
9 Absolute 
importance 
The importance of one over another affirmed on 
the highest possible order 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate 
values 
Used to represent compromise between the 
priorities listed above 
Reciprocals of 
above numbers 
 If item i has one of the above non-zero numbers 
assigned to it when compared to with item j, the 
j has the reciprocal value when compared with i 
Table 1. Scales of measurement in pair-wise comparison. Source: (Saaty, Thomas Lorie 1990) 
 
Matrix Size Random Index Recommended CR Values 
1 0.00 0.05 
2 0.00 0.05 
3 0.58 0.05 
4 0.90 0.08 
5 1.12 0.10 
6 1.24 0.10 
7 1.32 0.10 
8 1.41 0.10 
9 1.45 0.10 
10 1.49 0.10 
Table 2. Average Random Index values. Source: (Saaty, Thomas Lorie 1990) 
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From a KM perspective the most critical aspect of this step is to critically review the 
aforementioned analyses. A critical review will in this context revolve around finding 
answers for a variety of ‘why?’ questions as well as judging to what extent the analyses 
provide useful input to the risk management process and what must be done about 
significant gaps. Basically, we must understand how the analyses work, why they work and 
to what extent they work as planned. The most critical part of this is ensuring correct and 
useful definitions of risks and capabilities (Step 2). In any case, this step will reveal the 
quality of the preceding work – poor definitions will make pair-wise comparison hard.  
Running case 
From Step 2 we recall that there are 4 risk categories; 1) finance (FR), 2) technology (TR), 3) 
market (MR) and 4) communication (CR). Since AHP is hierarchical we are tempted to also 
rank these, but in order to give all the 39 risks underlying these 4 categories the same weight 
– 25% - we do not rank them (or give them the same rank, i.e. 1). Therefore, for our running 
example we must go to the bottom of the hierarchy and in the market category, for example, 
we find the following risks: 
1. Customer decides to not buy any project (MR1). 
2. Longer lead-times in sales than expected (MR2). 
3. Negative reactions from passengers due to the 90 degree turn (MR3). 
4. Passengers exposed to accidents/problems on demo plant (MR4). 
5. Wrong level of 'finished touch' on Demo plant (MR5).  
The pair-wise comparison of these is a three-step process. The first step is to determine 
possibilities, see Table 3, whereas the second step is to determine impacts. When discussing 
impacts it is important to use the list of capabilities and think of impact in their context.  
From Table 3 we see that MR2 (the second Market Risk) is perceived as the one with the 
highest possibility (47%) of occurrence. Indeed, it took about 10 years from this analysis first 
was carried out – using the risk management approach presented in (Emblemsvåg and 
Kjølstad 2002) – until it was decided to build the first system. We see from Table 2 that the 
CR value in the matrix of 0.088 is less than the recommended CR value of 0.10. This implies 
that the matric internally consistent and we are ready to proceed. A similar matrix should 
have been constructed concerning impacts, but this is omitted here. The impacts would also 
have been on a 0 to 1 percentage scale, so that when we multiply the possibilities and the 
impacts we get small numbers that can be normalized back on a 0 to 1 scale in percentages. 
This is done in Table 4 for the top ten risks.  
 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Possibility 
R1 1 0.14 0.20 3.00 0.33 8 % 
R2 7.00 1 3.00 5.00 4.00 47 % 
R3 5.00 0.33 1 4.00 3.00 26 % 
R4 0.33 0.20 0.25 1 0.33 6 % 
R5 3.00 0.25 0.33 3.00 1 14 % 
Sum 16.33 1.93 4.78 16.00 8.67  
CR value      0.088 
Table 3. Calculation of possibilities (subjective probabilities) 
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From Table 4 we see that the single largest risk is Financial Risk (FR) number 5, which is 
‘Payment guarantees not awarded’. It accounts for 27% of the total risk profile. Furthermore, 
the ten largest risks account for more than 80% of the total risk profile.  
The largest methodological challenge in this step is to combine the risks and capabilities. In 
(Emblemsvåg and Kjølstad 2002), the link was made explicit using a matrix, but the problem 
of that approach is that it requires an almost inhuman ability of thinking of risks 
independently of capabilities first and then think of it extremely clearly afterward when 
linking the risks and capabilities. The idea was good, but too difficult to use. It is therefore 
much more natural – almost inescapable, less time consuming and overall better to 
implicitly think of capabilities when we rate impacts and possibilities. A list of the 
capabilities is handy nonetheless to remind ourselves of what we as a minimum should take 
into consideration when performing the risk analysis.  
At the start of this section, we proposed to have four types of analyses that are integrated in 
the same model; 1) a risk analysis, 2) a sensitivity analysis of the risk analysis, 3) an 
uncertainty analysis and 4) a sensitivity analysis of the uncertainty analysis. So far, the latter 
three remains. The key to their execution is to model the input in the risk analysis matrices 
in two ways;  
1. Using symmetric distributions, such as symmetric 1 (around the values initially set in 
the AHP matrices) and uniform distributions shown to the left in Figure 6. It is 
important that they are symmetric in order to make sure that the mathematical impact 
on the risk analysis of each input is traced correctly. This will enable us to trace 
accurately what factors impact the overall risk profile the most – i.e., key risk factors.  
2. Modelling uncertainty as we perceive it as shown to the right in Figure 6. This will 
facilitate both an estimate on the consequences of the uncertainty in the input in the 
process as well as sensitivity analysis to identify what input needs improvement to most 
effectively reduce the overall uncertainty in the risk analysis – i.e., key uncertainty factors.  
 
Risks Possibility Impact 
Risk 
norm 
Risk, 
acc. 
FR5 Payment guarantees not awarded 10 % 12 % 27 % 27 % 
FR4 No exit strategy for foreign investors 8 % 8 % 15 % 42 % 
TR7 
Undesirable mechanical behavior 
(folding and unfolding) 6 % 6 % 9 % 50 % 
TR1 
Competitors attack NoWait due to safety 
issues 9 % 3 % 6 % 56 % 
MR3 
Negative reactions from passengers due 
to the 90 degree turn 6 % 4 % 6 % 62 % 
MR2 Longer lead-times in sales than expected 12 % 2 % 5 % 67 % 
CR1 
Business essentials are not presented 
clearly 9 % 2 % 5 % 72 % 
MR4 
Passengers exposed to 
accidents/problems on demo plant 1 % 13 % 4 % 76 % 
CR4 Business plan lack focus on benefits 6 % 2 % 3 % 79 % 
MR1 Customer decides to not buy any project 2 % 5 % 3 % 82 % 
Table 4. The ten largest risks in descending order 
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Before we can use the risk analysis model, we have to check the quality of the matrices. With 
4 risk categories we get 8 pair-wise comparison matrices (5 with possibility estimates and 5 
with impact estimates). Therefore, we first run a Monte Carlo simulation of 10,000 trials and 
record the number of times the matrices become inconsistent. The result is shown in the 
histogram on top in Figure 7. We see that the initial ranking of possibilities and impacts 
created only approximately 17% consistent matrices (the column to the left), and this is not 
good enough. The reason for this is that too many matrices had CR values of more than 
approximately 0.030. Consequently, we critically evaluated the pair-wise comparison 
matrices to reduce the CR values of all matrices to below 0.030. This resulted in massive 
improvements – about 99% of the matrices in all 10,000 trials remained consistent. This is 
excellent, and we can proceed to using the risk analysis model.  
A small sample of the results is shown in Figures 8 and 9. In Figure 8 we see a probability 
distribution for the 4 largest risks given a ±1 in all pair-wise comparisons. Clearly, there is 
very little overlay between the two largest risks indicating that the largest risk is a clear 
number 1. The more overlay, the higher the probability that the results in Table 4 are 
inconclusively ranked. Individual probability charts that are much more accurate are also 
available after a Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
for tracing 
for uncertainty 
Fig. 6. Modelling input in two different ways to support analysis of risk and uncertainty 
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In Figure 9 we see the sensitivity chart for the overall risk profile, or the sum of all risks, and 
this provides us with an accurate ranking of all key risk factors. Similar sensitivity charts are 
available for all individual risks, as well. Note, however, that since Monte Carlo simulations 
are statistical methods there are random effects. This means that the inputs in Figure 9 that 
have very small contribution to variance may be random. In plain words; when the 
contribution of variance is less than an absolute value of roughly 3% - 5% we have to be 
careful. The more trials we run, the more reliable the sensitivity charts become.  
Similar results to Figures 8 and 9 can also be produced for the uncertainty analysis of the 
risk analysis. Such analysis can answer questions such as what information should be 
improved to improve the quality of the risk analysis, and what effects can we expect from 
improving the information (this can be simulated). Due to space limitations this will be 
omitted here. Interested readers are referred to (Emblemsvåg 2010) for an introduction. For 
thorough discussions on Monte Carlo simulations, see (Emblemsvåg 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Improving the quality of the pair-wise comparison matrices 
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Fig. 8. The 4 largest risks in a subjective probability overlay chart given ±1 variation 
The final part of this step is to critically evaluate these analyses. Due to the enormous output 
of analytical information in this step, the analyses lend themselves to also critically evaluate 
the results. It should be noted that the AHP structure makes logic errors in the analysis very 
improbable. Hence, what we are looking for is illogic results, and the most important tool in 
this context is the sensitivity analyses.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Sensitivity chart for the overall risk profile given ±1 variation 
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The next step in the augmented risk management process is Step 4. Running case is omitted 
from here and onwards since this is not significantly different from traditional approaches 
except the KM part, which at the time was not conducted in this case due to the fact that this 
was a start-up company with no KM system or prior experience. 
4.4 Step 4 – Develop and implement strategies 
After step 3 we have abundant decision-support concerning developing risk management 
strategies and information management strategies. For example, from Figure 10 we can 
immediately identify what risk management strategies are most suited (i.e., risk prevention 
and impact mitigation). Since most inputs are possibilities, risk prevention is the most 
effective approach. When the issues are impacts, impact mitigation is the most effective 
approach, and as usual it is a mix between the two that works the best.  
These strategies are subsequently translated into both action plans (what to do) and 
contingency plans (what to do if a certain condition occurs). According to different surveys, 
less than 25% of projects are completed on time, on budget, and on the satisfaction of the 
customer, see (Management Center Europe 2002), emphasizing the focus on contingency 
planning as a vital part of risk management. “Chance favours the prepared mind”, in the 
words of Louis Pasteur. How to make action- and contingency plans is well described by 
(Government Asset Management Committee 2001) and will not be repeated here.  
Information management strategies will concern the cost versus benefit of obtaining better 
information. This is case specific, and no general guidelines exist except to consider the 
benefits and costs before making any information gathering decisions. Before making such 
decisions, it is also wise to review charts similar to Figures 8. If the uncertainty distributions 
do not overlap, there is no need to improve the information quality; it is good enough. If 
they do overlap, sensitivity charts can be used to pinpoint what on inputs we need to 
improve the information quality.  
KM in this step will include reviewing what has been done before, what went wrong, what 
worked well and why (knowledge and meta-knowledge). To the extent this is relevant for a 
specific case will greatly vary but the more cases are assembled in the KM system the 
greater the chances are that something useful can be found and therefore aid the process. In 
this step, however, it is equally important to use the results of the risk- and capability 
analyses performed in Step 3. These results can help pose critical questions which in turn 
can be important for effective learning.  
4.5 Step 5 – Measure performance 
The final step in the augmented risk management process is to measure the actual 
performance, that is, to identify the actual outcomes in real life. This may sound obvious, 
but often programs and initiatives are launched without proper measurement of results and 
follow-up, as (Jackson 2006) notes “Many Fortune 100 companies can plan and do, but they 
never check or act” [original italics]4. Checking relies on measurement and acting relies on 
checking, hence, without measuring performance it is impossible to gauge the effectiveness 
of the strategies and consequently learn from the process. This is commented on later.  
Finally, it should be noted that although it may look like the process ends after Step 5 in 
Figure 5 – the risk management process is to continuously operate until objectives are met.  
                                                 
4 The PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) circle is fundamental in systematic improvement work. 
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5. Critical evaluation and future ideas 
The research presented here is by no means finished. It is work in progress although some 
issues seem to have received a more final form than others. What future work that should be 
undertaken, are the following: 
1. Using the AHP matrices for pair-wise comparison is incredibly effective, but it is not 
workable for practitioners and personally we also believe that many academics will 
have a hard time making these matrices manually (as done here). Therefore, if the 
augmented risk management approach is to become commonly used and accepted it 
will need software that can create the matrices, help people fill in the reciprocal values 
and to simplify the Monte Carlo simulations.  
2. There is significant work to be done on the KM side. Today, we have quite good grasp 
of handling risks that occur quite frequently as shown by (Neef 2005). The ultimate test 
of such systems would be how the system could help people deal with risks that are 
highly infrequent – so called high impact, low probability (HILP) events. This is a 
common type of events in the natural world, but here even professional bodies treat 
risks the wrong way, as shown in (Emblemsvåg 2008). Such events are also far more 
common than what we believe in the corporate world with enormous consequences as 
(Taleb 2007) shows. Thus, KM systems that could tap from a large variety of sources, to 
give people support in dealing with such difficult cases, would be useful.  
3. Many risks cross the organizational boundaries between business units (known and 
unknown when the risk management process is initiated) and this raises the issues of 
interoperability and managing risk in that context, see (Meyers 2006). He defines 
interoperability as ‘the ability of a set of communicating entities to (1) exchange 
specified information and (2) operate on that information according to a specified, 
agreed-upon, operational semantics’. The augmented risk management process has not 
been tested in such a setting, which should be done to prove that it works across 
organizational boundaries. In fact, due to the more consistent risk analysis, terminology 
and decision support of the augmented risk management process, it is expected that 
many of the problems (Meyers 2006) raises are solved, but it must be proven. KM, 
however, in an interoperable environment is a difficult case.  
4. Whether the augmented risk management process would work for statistical risk 
management processes is also something for future work. Intuitively, the augmented 
risk management process should work for statistical risk management processes 
because statistical risk management also has a human touch, as the discussion in 
Section 1 shows. .  
There are probably other, less pressing issues to solve, but this is the focus forward. Item 1 is 
mostly a software issue and is not commented further here. If this issue is resolved the risk 
analysis itself and the information management part would be solved. The issue concerning 
interoperability is a matter of testing, development of specifications and definitions 
necessary when crossing organizational boundaries. KM, however, is a difficult case – 
particularly if we include the issues of interoperability.  
Since the origin of risks is multi-layered, it is important with a systemic approach towards 
KM. Also, some risks materialize quite seldom, from an individual perspective, but quite 
often on a corporate perspective, such as financial crises. This is another argument for a 
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systemic approach on a wide scale that assembles knowledge from many arenas. Finally, the 
very rare risks, those that are high impact and low probability, can only be handled in a 
systematic way because any one person is not likely to experience more than one such risk 
in decades and hence memory becomes too inefficient. Another issue is that to evoke the 
right feeling of risk, people must internalize the risks and this can be really difficult. To 
borrow from (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) - explicit knowledge must be internalized and 
become tacit. Otherwise, the risk profile will not be understood.  
From the literature we learn that the SECI model is an effective approach in handling tacit 
knowledge. Kusunoki, Nonaka et al. (1995), for example, demonstrated that the SECI model 
is good at explaining the successes where system-based capacities are linked with multi-
layered knowledge. This is directly relevant for risk management, just mentioned 
previously. Thus, the SECI model seems to be a promising avenue for improving or 
complementing the more information-based KM systems that (Neef 2005) discusses. But, 
according to (Davenport and Prusak 1997), the philosophical position to Nonaka is in 
striking contrast to scholars subscribing to the information-based view of knowledge, which 
leads to IT based KM systems. Therefore, we must bridge the gap between these two main 
avenues of KM: 1) the information-based KM systems which are good at getting hold of 
large quantities of explicit knowledge, and 2) the SECI process which is good at converting 
all knowledge into action and vice versa. The SECI process is also good at generating new 
knowledge and making it explicit. How this bridge will work is still unclear and hence 
needs future work. 
6. Closure 
This chapter has presented an augmented risk management process. Compared to the 
traditional process there are many technical improvements, such as the usage of AHP 
matrices to ensure much more correct and consistent risk assessments, the usage of Monte 
Carlo simulations to improve the risk analysis and facilitate information management. 
However, it is still work in progress and the real issue that needs to be resolved in the 
future, for risk management to really become as important as it should be, is the 
establishment of a reliable KM process – particularly for HILP events. It is these events that 
cause havoc and need increased and systematic attention. How this can be achieved is 
currently unclear, except that it seems that we must listen to Albert Einstein’s famous 
statement that “Imagination is more important than knowledge”.  
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